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SYSTEM RELIABILITY MATHEMATICAL MODELING
Lee R. Webster
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION 
of
FAIRCHILD KILLER CORPORATION 
Bladensburg, Md.
INTRODUCTION
The reliability mathematical model of a 
system is the basis of all reliability pre­ 
dictions, optimization, apportionment, and 
virtually all other system reliability analyses. 
Because of the importance of the math model, 
maximum care should be taken in its construction. 
A system reliability model is defined here as a 
probability expression which represents the actual 
system configuration such that when the relia­ 
bilities of the system elements are known along 
with certain other mission parameter values, the 
expression can be used to calculate the overall 
system mission reliability. The complexity of 
the model structure depends upon the complexity 
of the system it represents and upon the degree 
of accuracy used in approximating the actual 
system configuration. The well known series 
model, wherein the system reliability is given 
by the product of all the constituent element 
reliabilities is the simplest type. The accuracy 
of the series model will generally tend to be 
very high if the failure of any constituent 
element will cause the failure of the system of 
interest. However, more complex model types are 
required in order to accurately represent a 
system containing a relatively large number of 
alternate paths or modes of operation.
SUMMARY
This paper discusses the general procedures 
and considerations involved in the construction 
and improvement of system reliability models. 
Specific points covered include the performance 
of supporting operations analyses; the utili­ 
zation of the system block diagrams and the 
failure mode and effect analysis in generating 
the system reliability diagram; and a summary 
of many of the more widely used mathematical 
tools used to transform the system function 
diagram into a system reliability expression.
The application of the procedure discussed 
is demonstrated on the Power Control and Con­ 
version Assemblies of the Advanced Orbiting 
Solar Observatory (AOSO).
The AOSO Power Conversion and Control 
Assemblies are a portion of a project being 
performed for NASA by the Fairchild Killer 
Electronics and Information Systems Division. 
These assemblies contain a large number of 
alternate operating modes and series-parallel 
situations which are used to satisfy an extremely 
high reliability requirement. These redundancy 
provisions plus a number of important but 
unknown quantities and other mission parameters, 
all of which must be taken into account, make 
the power control and conversion assemblies 
excellent examples for demonstrating the appli­ 
cation of a wide variety, of math modeling 
techinques.
MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
Mathematical Tools
In a large majority of modeling situations, 
systems can be broken up into series or series- 
parallel combinations. The system reliability 
math model in these cases is constructed using 
one or more of a family of fairly widely known 
probability expressions and techniques. There 
are some configurations, however, which can not 
be expressed as combinations of series and/or 
parallel terms and therefore require more complex 
and somewhat less popular techniques. The follow­ 
ing is a brief summary of the more widely used 
and fundamental procedures used in reliability 
math modeling.
Series
The simplest system model is the series config­ 
uration. In this model the system is represented 
as a chain and the total reliability is the product 
of all the individual element or link reliabilities. 
Thus, it is assumed that the failure of any element 
or link causes system failure and that system rel­ 
iability is directly related to system complexity. 
For any given system and set of element failure rates, 
the value of system reliability which is predicted 
using a series model will be the minimum possible 
value and thus the most conservative. Because of 
the above, "parts count" reliability estimates are 
often used for making "ballpark" or "first cut" 
estimates of the reliability of a system.
Redundancy
When it becomes necessary to account for redundant 
system elements, various elements states, or alter­ 
nate modes of system operation, the system math model 
becomes more complex. Before one can generate the 
reliability expression for redundant elements, it 
must be determined whether the back up elements are 
operating "on line" along with the main element or 
if they are on standby duty to be used only in the 
event of failure of the main element.
Functional Redundancy- When only one of a group 
of elements, simultaneously operating in parallel is 
needed, the total reliability for the group is one 
minus the product of the element unreliabilities.*
-Note: This result neglects possible increases in 
element failure rates caused by increased loading 
resulting from the failure of other elements. This 
is one result of the assumption of statistical 
independence made for all elements throughout this 
paper unless otherwise specified.
309
7TR = 1 -
Where:
R = total reliability of the group 
of redundant elements.
<fy. = the unreliability of the i th 
1 element
n = number of elements in parallel
Similarly, if all the elements have equal 
reliabilities, the group reliability R, then 
becomes:
/TV
R = 1 - Ou
This last result is also obtained from 
expansion of
where
JTL - the reliability of each of the i 
elements
n = the total number of parallel elements
As before % is the probability of all 
n units failing and /— jL- is the probability 
of at least one unit operating, i.e. the group 
reliability.
Many times it becomes necessary to account 
for differences in element failure modes. For 
example, if an element can fail only as an open 
circuit and if n are arranged as in Figure 1, 
the group reliability is found from the pre­ 
viously given expression
R = i - V"
If, however, the above elements are arranged 
in series, the group reliability becomes J& 
since the opening of any one element causes the 
whole group to fail. Similarly then, it can 
be seen that if elements which fail only as 
short circuits»are arranged per figure 1, the 
group reliability becomes A/1*' since the 
shorting of any one element results in total 
group failure. Thus, it follows by placing 
elements which fail only by shorting in series 
the group reliability is given by:
Sequential Redundancy - When only one of a 
group identical elements is in use while the 
remainder are in a non-operating stand-by status 
waiting to be switched in one by one upon failure 
of the operating element, the total reliability 
is given by 
(neglecting switching reliability)
Where:
(3 = base of the natural log system
A = the failure rate of each of the n elements 
~L = mission time
If the operating and the non-operating standby 
elements have different reliabilities, the total 
reliability for the group requires the integration of 
the joint density function of the combination. This 
is a very general procedure being applicable regardless 
if the elements are equal or if they have exponential 
reliability functions. In cases where the element 
reliability functions are exponential, the density 
function £t is given as:
For two different elements having failure rates 
X | and \ , the density functions are 
respectively,
> e' Ajtt
where: 
t{ = time of failure of element number 1
L! = time of failure of element number 2 = £. 
u = mission time
The probability of both elements failing in an in-, 
finitely small time interval t> t t+• &tr is the 
product of the two density functions. Integrating this 
product from fct ~ O to t, = mission time, ^9 
obtains the joint density function, p(.t) for 
the two element combination in terms of the single variable
tt -0
again looking at the exponential use this result is
The integration of this result, with respect to time 
from t to infinity is the summation of all possible 
combinations of the time of failure for elements 1 and 2 
which result in the system failing after mission time "t 
and is therefore the combined reliability R , for the 
two element arrangement (again neglecting switching rel­ 
iability) ,
R
and for the exponential case
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Functional and Sequential Redundancy Combinations 
Other types of redundancy which are variations of 
the sequential and/or functional type are given in 
Table I. Also included in the table are reference 
sources which provide more complete information on 
the derivation of the probability models listed.
Bayes 1 Theorem- Occasionally a system config­ 
uration will be encountered in which the elements 
are not arranged in series or combinations of func­ 
tional or sequential redundancy.
One example of such a case would be a config­ 
uration such as shown in Figure 2. In- this system, 
the successful or operating states which are pos­ 
sible are AB, CB, CD, and ED. Thus, unlike the 
redundancy configuration on Figure 3, the combi­ 
nations AD and EB are not possible. Bayes 'Theorem 
states that if I is an event which depends upon 
one of two mutually exclusive events, H and J, of 
which one must necessarily occur, then the proba­ 
bility of the occurence of I is given by
Applying Bayes 1 Theorem to block C of the 
system in Figure 2, the following can be stated:
System Reliability Diagram
Simply stated, the reliability diagram is a 
schematic representation of the system functions 
and subfunctions combined in a probability sense 
rather than signal flow. The system reliability 
diagram serves as a basis for making the transistion 
from the system functional block diagram to the 
system reliability math model. This is because the 
math model is merely mathematical expression for the 
logic implicit in the reliability diagram. A typical 
reliability diagram is generated in the following 
example: Figure 4 is a signal flow or functional 
block diagram of an engine starting circuit for an 
automobile. Figure 5 is the reliability diagram of 
the same system. Although a number of elements in 
Figure 4 are wired in parallel, in a reliability 
sense all these elements are in series since they 
are all needed to start the engine.
The simplicity of the reliability diagrams in 
the above example is the exception rather than the 
rule.
Nearly all reliability diagrams 
(and math models) are approximations. As 
such, the two essential characteristics of 
the system reliability diagram are that it 
be sufficiently representative of the system 
operation and that it not be so complicated as 
to make the resulting math model unusable. 
The satisfaction of both of the requirements be­ 
comes increasingly difficult as the system 
complexity increases and requires considerable 
interplay of the system design engineering, 
operations analysis, and reliability engineer­ 
ing disciplines. In many instances, for example,
it is a considerable task to define such a basic concept 
as system or mission success.
The system reliability block diagram should be 
constructed as early as possible in the evolution of 
the system configuration. This will permit the analyst 
to give full consideration to design audit and failure 
mode and effect analysis data in up dating the con­ 
struction of the math model. By virtue of the increased 
accuracy of the math model and its availability early 
in the project,the reliability engineer is in a position 
to not only more realistically monitor the quality of 
the design job but also to provide design engineering 
with better analytical support for design improvement 
and optimization which will be discussed later.
Returning to the engine starting problem, Figure 6 
shows an improved reliability block diagram which 
includes failure mode and effect analysis data. In 
this diagram it can be seen that the manual crank is 
effective only if the starter and/or solenoid has 
failed open, and if the battery has been discharged 
less than 70%. This shows that the probability of at 
least turning the engine over either electrically or 
manually during the starting process is less than unity 
which is implied in Figure 5.
System Reliability Math Model
After the reliability block diagram has been 
generated, the system reliability math model is con­ 
structed by utilizing a variety of mathematical tools 
and probability expressions, such as surveyed earlier, 
to develop and combine expressions for subassembly 
and/or subfunction reliabilities. When these sub- 
assembly and/ or subfunction reliabilities are quantized, 
the model can be solved to predict system reliability.
MODEL USE
Although the system reliability math model is 
probably most widely used for performing reliability 
predictions, there are a number of other important 
applications which can be made in an efficient, modern 
reliability program. These additional applications 
include design reliability optimization, system effective­ 
ness analysis, and technical management decision making.
Design Reliability Optimization
The function of optimizing the reliability of a 
design is defined here to be the selection of that system 
configuration, from the family of all possible con­ 
figurations which are acceptable for a given task, 
which has optimum values of reliability and other system 
parameters such as weight, cost, etc. In general, 
there are two types of reliability optimization problems.
Problem Type I. In what is called here a type I 
problem, a system reliability requirement is specified 
and it is desired to obtain a system configuration 
which just satisfies this requirement and which also 
satisfies other constraints which may be stated or 
implied. An example would be to configure a system 
such that it has a 90% reliability, a maximum weight of 
100 Ibs., and a minimum cost.
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Problem Type II. The second type problem is 
essentially the reverse of Type I. The objective 
in this problem is to configure a system which has 
the maximum reliability possible while still satis­ 
fying all other specified constraints. Such as 
maximum levels of weight, volume, and cost.
There are a number of optimization procedures 
available and undoubtedly many improvements are 
forthcoming as a result of the increasing research 
activity in this area. The use of one of these 
methods will be briefly demonstrated herein on a 
portion of a satellite power system.
System E ffe ctiveness Ana 1 ysis
By including system deployment variables such 
as maintainability, down times, etc., into the 
construction of the reliability math model, a 
figure of merit for system effectiveness is obtained.
Performing design reliability optimization 
analyses with the inclusion of deployment variables 
information then implies the derivation of a system
configuration having an optimum or maximum effective­ 
ness.
Technical Management Decision Making
If the reliability math modeling process is 
begun early and kept current throughout the R & D 
effort, it is a relatively simple task to utilize 
the model to obtain information very useful in 
directing engineering effort, design emphasis, and 
system philosophy. Relatively minor analyses can 
be performed during preliminary design in order to 
competitively evaluate alternate system philosophies, 
identify reliability limitations posed by state of 
the art requirements, and having selected a system 
philosophy, to design both a reliability and a 
development program plan. During the progress of 
the development effort, the same type of analysis 
as performed above will assist in isolating and 
assessing requirements for shifts in engineering 
effort and/or emphasis.
Reliability Model for AOSO Power Control and 
Conversion Assemblies
Problem
The reliability mathematical model construction 
and use techniques are demonstrated in the following 
discussion of the AOSO (Advanced Orbiting Solar 
Observatory) power control and power conversion 
assemblies. The specified mission for AOSO is a 
70% reliability for one year of orbital operation. 
The apportioned reliability requirements for the 
power conversion and control assemblies for the one 
year mission are 94.3% and 97.1% respectively. 
There is an additional requirement of a 0.915 rel­ 
iability for the combination of both assemblies.
Model Construction
First Estimate- The "first cut" or "ball park" 
reliability estimate of the subject assemblies was 
based strictly upon a parts count prediction. 
Although the resulting predicted reliability value 
of 0.51% was comparatively low, it was also obvious 
that the use of the series model or parts count 
approach was too conservative and th#t a number of 
mission parameters needed to be quantized.
Operations and System Analysis- In order to better 
define the existing system configuration and the mission 
requirements for the two assemblies, extensive operations 
and system analyses were undertaken.
System Analysis- In analyzing the system, reliability 
and design engineers concentrated primarily on the 
completion of a preliminary failure mode and effect 
analysis (FMEA). This analysis established the cause, 
type, and probability of occurence of subassembly 
failure and determined the consequences of these failures 
to the operation of the two assemblies with respect to 
degradation of output and to the availability of alter­ 
nate modes of operation. In addition, the system was 
also broken up into specific functions which were defined, 
classified, and related to appropriate circuitry and/or 
subsystems.
The results of the system analysis included such 
items as the following:
1. The functions of taper (high rate Charging)
and trickle (low rate charging) of the satellite 
batteries by the control assembly were identi­ 
fied and the conditions under which each can be
performed were determined.
2. The actual redundancy in the solar paddle
deployment squid firing circuits of the control 
assembly was determined,
3. Since the non-operating standby battery has a
predictable loss of charge rate under open circuit 
conditions at the design ambient temperature, 
the trickle Charging of the standby battery 
need only be supplied for the first 7792 hours 
of the mission.
Operations Analysis, This effort consisted of the 
AOSO mission requirements to determine the more specific 
mission requirements for the power conversion and 
control assemblies. In addition, there was a joint 
effort with the AOSO prime contractor to perform a 
failure mode of operation study. This study was an 
overall AOSO system investigation into what type of 
assembly failures actually caused mission abort. 
(This is a different goal than for the failure mode 
and effect analysis performed during the system analysis 
which considered performance outside of assembly 
specification limits as a failure).
The results of these studies included the following:
1. Reliability calculations should be based on a 
mission time of 8800 hours instead of 8760 in 
order to account for the increased environ­ 
mental severity during launch.
2. Although only one battery is needed for operation, 
thus leaving the remaining battery as a non- 
operating standby unit, the mission of the con­ 
version and control assembly must be able to 
maintain either battery at full charge for one 
year. Thus, the redundancy advantage is taken 
into account in the overall AOSO system analysis.
3. Due to the more or less linear decay (caused by 
radiation) of the power generating capabilities 
of the solar paddles with respect to time, the 
solar array voltage limiter is actually needed 
only for approximately the first 4000 hours of 
the one year flight.
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System Reliability Diagram The results 
of the operations and system analyses described 
above were used in the first attempt to construct 
the reliability block diagram of the conversion 
and control assemblies (Figures 7, 8, 9.)
Figure 7 merely shows the series relation­ 
ship between the control and conversion assem­ 
blies, i.e. both are needed for mission success.
Figures 8 and 9 are reliability diagrams 
of the power control assembly and the battery 
charge regulation function of the control 
assembly, respectively. No figure -is included 
for the power conversion assembly since, during 
this phase of the AOSO Program, it was simply 
a series string of assemblies as will be 
described later.
System Reliability Math Model In develop­ 
ing the mathematical models for the power con­ 
version and control assemblies, the following 
assumptions and conditions are made:
1. The power control assembly requirement 
is interpreted as follows:
The power control assembly shall 
have a 97.1% probability of main­ 
taining a full charge on a speci­ 
fied Operating Battery and a 
Standby Battery for a mission 
duration of 8800 hours, (note that 
this provision neglects the fact 
that the batteries are redundant 
by essentially stating that both 
are needed.)
2. The failure of a State of Charge 
Monitor is assumed to result in an 
open, such that the associated battery 
must be utilized in the circuit through 
an alternate route.
If the original Operating Battery loses 
80% of its charge as indicated by its 
state of charge monitor, or has a 
State of Charge Monitor failure, it is 
replaced by the Standby Battery. 
Emergency mode .operation is initiated 
whenever both batteries are below 50% 
of charge. It is assumed that the 
emergency mode merely provides the 
system, upon ground command switching, 
with the capability that either charger 
can be used to charge either of the 
two batteries on the line (See Figure 9) 
Time consumed in having to recharge 
dead batteries and problems in removing 
(if required) catastrophically failed 
units from the line are not considered.
3. The definitions of taper and trickle
charge used herein are somewhat broader 
than the usual technical definitions. 
Essentially, taper charging is used to 
designate a high charge rate as opposed 
to trickle charging which is that charge 
rate used to maintain a full charge on 
the Standby Battery. Thus, the battery 
charge regulation function is said to 
contain one Taper Charger, one Trickle 
Charger, and a Backup Charger which has 
a taper charge mode and a trickle charge 
mode.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
The taper charge mode of the Backup Charger 
is assumed to be useable only when the Taper 
Charger has failed or when the power control 
assembly is in the emergency mode of operation.
The trickle charge mode of the Backup Charger 
is used to replace the failed Trickle Charger 
only if the Taper Charger has not failed. 
In addition, it is assumed that both the 
Trickle and Taper Charging modes of the backup 
charger have the same failure rate.
The Backup Charger is assumed to have a 
non-operating standby failure rate equal 
to zero.
Ambient battery temperatures are assumed to 
be equal to the maximum design temperature of 
110 F for purposes of deriving the period of 
time required by a fully charged battery to 
lose 50% of its charge, while on non-operating 
standby and open circuit conditions.
Ambient power control and power conversion 
assembly temperatures are assumed to be 150°F.
All elements are assumed to have an exponential 
reliability distribution.
Only "on board" electronics and/or systems are 
considered. Ground based equipments, signal 
conditioning circuits, and human inputs are 
neglected.
The reliability of the switching functions 
shown as items (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), and 
(12) in Figure 9 is assumed to be independent 
of time and refers to a single switchover 
operation.
The life of a State of Charge Monitor is 
small compared to the life of a battery.
Modes of degraded system operation, such as 
those employing the trickle charger when 
the taper and backup chargers have failed, 
are not considered.
The advantages of making more than one change 
between primary and backup charge modes are
not considered,
At least one source of trickle charge is re­ 
quired for the standby battery from start 
of mission to 7792 hours.
16. No provision is made for epoxy covered solder
connections,
Power Con,tro 1. Assemb 1 y - Figure 8 is the relia­ 
bility diagram, for the four functions performed by 
the power control assembly. As shown in Figure 8 
the Power Control Assembly will satisfy its mission 
r e q u i r erne; n t s i f:
1) The hold-off function is performed properly 
prior to and at the initiation of launch.
2} The paddle deployment function is satisfactorily 
completed when initiated.
3) The battery charge regulation function is 
performed for one year, and
4) The solar array voltage limiter function is 
satisfactorily performed for one year.
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Referring to Figure 8, the expression 
for the reliability, R(PCA), of the Power 
Control Assembly is:
R(PCA) = R(RO) R(PD) R(BCR) R(SAVL) 
where:
R(HO) = the reliability of the Hold-Off 
Circuitry
R(PD) = the reliability of the Paddle 
Deployment circuitry
R(BCR) = the reliability of the Battery 
Charge Regulation function
R(SAVL)= the reliability of the Solar
Array Voltage limiter function
The Hold-Off and Paddle Deployment 
functions are performed by series type electronic 
circuitry. The reliability of the devices pro­ 
viding these functions is represented by the 
product of the reliabilities of the piece parts 
that compose the devices. Therefore:
R(HO) = IT Ri
1=1
and
R(PD) - TT
where: R-j_ = the numerical reliability of the 
ith piece part in the Hold-Off 
circuitry
n = the total number of piece parts that 
1 make up the Hold-Off circuitry
R. = the numerical reliability of the 
J jth piece part in the Paddle De­ 
ployment circuitry
no = the total number of piece parts
in the Paddle Deployment circuitry
Figure 9 is the reliability diagram for 
the Battery Charge Regulation function. The 
Battery Charge Regulation function is provided 
by a Taper Charger, a Trickle Charger, a 
Backup Charger with both a taper and trickle 
charge capability, two State of Charge Monitors 
each associated with a particular spacecraft 
battery, and a group of logic and switching 
circuits. The Battery Charge Regulation 
function is satisfactorily performed if the 
Operating Battery (either Battery A or Battery 
B) receives a taper charge and the Standby 
Battery (Battery B or Battery A) receives a 
trickle charge.
In the primary mode of operation the 
Taper Charger feeds the Operating Battery 
through its associated State of Charge Monitor 
and the Trickle Charger feeds the Standby 
Battery directly. Under these conditions, 
the Backup Charger is maintained in a non- 
operating standby status.
If the Operating Battery State of Charge Monitor 
fails, the Taper Charger can be switched through the 
Ground Command Bypass Loop to the Operating Battery. 
If the Taper Charger fails, or it both the State of 
Charge Monitor and the Ground Command Bypass Loop 
fail;
1) a ground command can turn on the taper
charge mode of the Backup Charger and feed 
the Operating Battery from the Backup Charger
2) The operating and Standby Batteries are 
interchanged automatically by the battery 
selector switch or by the Ground Command 
Modules Nos. 7 and 9. This operation also 
requires successful operation of the Ground 
Command Module No. 6 which switches the 
Taper Charging Function to the new operating 
battery.
3) if both batteries are below the prescribed 
level of charge, the emergency mode is in­ 
itiated, or
4) both the Operating and Standby Batteries are 
brought on the line by the action of two 
zener diodes when the line voltage drops 
more than 12 volts below the highest terminal 
voltage of the two batteries
In the event of (3) or (4) above, taper charging 
is supplied both batteries simultaneously by the 
taper charger or the backup charger.
If the Trickle Charger fails, a ground command 
must turn on the trickle charge mode of the Backup 
Charger (assuming the Backup Charger is not then 
feeding the Operating Battery) and feed the Standby 
Battery from the Backup Charger.
Referring to Figure 9 9 the Battery Charge Regulation 
function will be satisfactorily performed if the 
Common Selector Logic does not fail, and if either:
1) The Taper Charger (1) charges the Operating 
Battery either through the associated State 
of Charge Monitor (2) , or through the Ground 
Command Number One Bypass loop (12), or
2) If the Ground Command Switch (4) turns on the 
taper charge mode of the Backup Charger (3) 
which then charges the Operating Battery
In addition, success has been assumed to imply that 
a charge is maintained on the Standby Battery (see 
assumption 1). Therefore, successful performance of the 
Battery Charge Regulation function also requires that:
1) The Trickle Charger (8) operates satisfactorily, 
or that
2) The Ground Command Switch (5) , the taper charger 
(1) , and the trickle charge mode of the Backup 
Charger (14) operate satisfactorily (see 
assumption 5), or that
3) The Emergency Mode functions properly or that
4) The Battery Selection Mode does not fail
Proper operation of the Standby Battery implies that it 
be charged to at least 50 percent of its capacity at 
the time it is switched to Operating Battery status.
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Presently available information indicates that 
a fully charged nickel-cadmium battery at the 
maximum AOSO temperature of 110°F, under no- 
charge, no load conditions, will lose 50 per­ 
cent of its charge in 42 days (1008 hours). 
Therefore, the Standby Battery must receive 
a trickle charge from the state of the mission, 
until no more than 42 days before failure of the 
Operating battery. If the primary trickle 
charge mode (that is, if the Trickle Charger 
itself) fails, the trickle charge mode of the 
Backup Charger will be switched on and will 
feed the Standby Battery. This assumes that it 
is not already supplying the Operating Battery 
(see assumption 5). The trickle charge mode 
of the Backup Charger will then be required 
to operate without failure from the time of the 
failure of the Trickle Charger until no more 
than 42 days before failure of the Operating 
Battery.
Lack of information prevents the identifi­ 
cation of the reliability distributions of the 
AOSO batteries at this time. Even if this 
information were available, the derivation of a 
precise expression for the probability of suc­ 
cessful performance of the trickle charger 
function would require the summation of all 
successful combinations of Taper Charger, 
Trickle Charger, and Backup Charger success 
and failure, along with conditional proba­ 
bilities associated with the performance of the 
Operating Battery over the time interval from
T = 0 to T' = t (end of mission). The result 
is a very unwieldy set of integrals. In order 
to eleviate this situation, it is specified 
(see assumption 16) that either the Trickle 
Charger or the trickle charge mode of the 
Backup Charger must operate from the start of 
the mission to within 42 days or 1008 hours 
before the end of the one year mission time, t. 
The resulting expression is conservative in that 
it completely neglects all those combinations 
of circumstances in which successful system 
operation will result in spite of failure of 
both the Trickle Charger and the trickle charge 
mode of the Backup charger prior to t - 1008 
hours or 7792 hours.
The Common Selector Logic shown in Figure 9 
consists of two silicon controlled rectifiers 
(SCR) . The reliability R(CSL) , of the Common 
Selector Logic is merely the product of the 
reliabilities for the SCR's.
2 
R(CSL) = | | R(SCR) i
i = 1
The reliability for the Emergency Mode is 
essentially determined by the emergency mode 
circuitry. There is, however, a backup for 
this circuitry. The backup for the emergency 
mode circuitry consists of two zener diodes which 
cause both batteries to be switched on to the 
main line whenever the line voltage drops more 
than 12 volts below the highest of the two 
battery terminal voltages. Because of the 
different operating principles employed, this 
backup system does not act to remove non-essential 
loads from the line and will require a larger 
time delay for operation. Therefore, the backup 
system is not operationally equivalent to the 
emergency mode circuitry, although these alternates
are considered equal in the development of the math­ 
ematical model. The reliability, R(EM), of the 
Emergency Mode is then the probability that either 
the emergency mode circuitry (Rio) or its backup 
circuitry (Rn) operates.
R(EM) 1 - (1 - RIO) (1 - Rll)
The reliability of the battery selection mode 
R(BS) is the probability that the Ground Command 
Module No. 6 operates times the probability that 
either the battery selection circuitry or the Backup 
Ground Command Modules Nos. 7 and 9 operate. The 
reliability of the selection circuitry is equal to 
the probability, Rg, that both battery sensors 
operate times the probability, Ra , that both sensor 
modules operate, times the probability, R^DJ that 
the C, C-j^, and D logic modules operate. Thus,
R(BS) = R6 1 - (1 - RaRaRcD) (1 - R7R9)
The reliability, R(BCR), of the Battery Charge 
Regulation function can now be expressed as a function 
of the respective reliabilities of the Common 
Selector Logic, R(CSL), and of the devices involved 
in the primary, backup, and emergency modes of 
operation.
Let:
F = the probability of failure of the 
primary charge mode in the time 
period A t,
R(BCR) = the reliability of the Battery Charge 
Regulation function
t = the total mission time of 8800 hours
RjL = the reliability of the ith device 
in the Battery Charge Regulation. 
function and i = 1, 2, 3, . . , 
corresponding to the numbering of 
the blocks in Figure 9.
±2 = the probability of failure of the
Operating Battery State of Charge 
Monitor in the time period
R3(t-tTl) = the probability of successful operation 
of the Backup Charger from the time 
of failure of the primary charge 
mode,t^» to the end of the mission, t
G = the probability of failure of the 
Trickle Charger in, the time period
Rg(t-1008-t2)= the probability of successful operation
of the trickle charge mode of the 
Backup Charger from the time of 
failure of the Trickle Charger, ~t 2, 
to t - 1008 hours
R(EM) = emergency mode reliability
R(BS) - battery selection mode reliability
R(CSL) - Common Selector Logic reliability
(Note assumption 12 regarding the time independence of 
the switching devices (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (12) )
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Then. R(BCR) 
^t
1 f 
Rt R5 J
t-1008
T) + R4 FR3 (t-ri)d
(t-1008-
fl-R(BS)R R(CSL)
The Solar Array Voltage Limiter function is 
provided by a difference amplifier, a driver 
stage, and a power stage. Satisfactory perform­ 
ance of the Solar Array Voltage Limiter function
 
requires that all three devices perform satis­ 
factorily. Therefore, the general expression 
for the reliability of the Solar Array Voltage 
Limiter function, R(SAVL) , is:
R(SAVL) = R(DA) R(DS) R(PS)
where:
R(DA) = the reliability of the 
Difference Amplifier
R(DS) = the reliability of the 
Driver Stage
R(PS) = the reliability of the 
Power Stage
Both the Difference Amplifier and the Driver 
Stage are series type electronic circuits., 
The reliability model for each, device is, 
therefore, simply the product of the reliabiliti
es 
of the piece parts that make up the device. If:
Rk = the reliability of the kth
piece part in the Difference 
Amplifier, and
n~ - the total number of piece 
parts in the Difference 
Amplifier, the reliability 
model of the Difference 
Amplifier is given by:
R(DA) •ft
k=l
Similarly, if:
= the reliability of the mth piece 
part in the Driver Stage, and
= the total number of piece parts 
in the Driver Stage, the model 
of the reliability, R(DS) , 
of the Driver Stage is given 
by:
R(DS)
H-
TT
m=l
The power stage consists of nine parallel 
branches, each comprising a transistor and a 
resitor. Proper operation of the Power Stage 
requires that the first two branches be fed by
the Driver Stage, and any four of the remaining 
seven branches operate satisfactorily. Each bra
nch 
is fused. Therefore, only "open" type failures 
are 
possible. To derive the mathematical model of 
the reliability, R(PS) of the Power Stage, let:
r = the reliability of any one of the 
nine parallel branches, and
q = the unreliability of any one of the 
branches
Then the mathematical model is given by:
R!(PS)= r 2 (r ? + 7r6q -f 21r q2 + 35r q3) .
Substituting the derived mathematical models in 
the general expression yields the mathematical 
model for the reliability of the Solar Array 
Voltage Limiter:
R(SAVL)
n3
TT
k=l
tIT* r2 (r 7 7r 6q 21r q 35r4q3)
Summary:
In summary, the general expression for the 
reliability of the power control assembly in ter
ms 
of the reliability of the functions performed by
 
the power control assembly equipment, is:
R(PCA)
Since:
R(HO)
R(HO) R(PD) R(BCR) R(SAVL)
the reliability of the Hold-off 
circuitry
TT
a=l
V
R(PD) the reliability of the Paddle 
Deployment circuitry
-IT R.,
R(BCR) = the reliability of the Battery Charge 
Regulation function
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R(SAVL) = the reliability of the Solar 
Array Voltage Limiter
where:
*3
?,**•'
R = the reliability of the ith subassembly
the reliability mathematical model of the 
power control assembly is:
The predicted reliability resulting from 
the solution of the above model is the pro­ 
bability that a taper charge and a trickle 
charge will be available for an Operating 
Battery and a Standby Battery, respectively, 
for a period of 8800 hours in orbit. This is 
a very conservative statement of the mission 
problem, however, since all that is required 
for AOSO success is the ability to taper 
charge either of the two batteries.
The model describing this latter problem 
would not require that the Trickle Charge 
Function not fail. Instead, a conditional 
probability would be associated with the 
requirement for the Trickle Charge Function 
for mission success. Thus, (referring to 
Figure 9 ) the taper charge function would be 
directly connected to the Operating Battery 
and the Trickle Charge Function, the Emergency 
Mode, or the Battery Selection Mode would be 
utilized only with the condition that the 
Operating Battery fails. A reliability value 
cannot be calculated from this latter model 
at present, however, since nothing is known 
about the probability of having to switch from 
the Operating to the Standby Battery and, as 
mentioned earlier, the accounting for the re­ 
dundant batteries will take place in the over 
all AOSO analysis performed by the prime con­ 
tractor.
Power Conversion Assembly - The mathematical 
model of the reliability of the Power Conversion 
Assembly is relatively simple. There are 14 
subassemblies that make up the Power Conversion 
Assembly. All of these subassemblies must 
operate properly if the Power Conversion 
Assembly is to satisfy its requirements. There­ 
fore, the reliability of the Power Conversion 
Assembly is simply the product of the reliabil­ 
ities of the 14 subassemblies. Mathematically, 
this is expressed as
14
R(Power Conversion) = T I R-
Model Use
System Reliability Prediction - The quantative analysis 
consists of the evaluation of the mathematical models 
derived above. In order to perform this evaluation, a 
tabulation of part types, quantities, and failure rates 
are made for each of the blocks in the reliability diagram. 
This tabulated information permits the calculation of the 
subassembly reliabilities which are then combined in the 
manner prescribed by the reliability mathematical models. 
The results of reliability predictions using the math 
model developed above are shown in Table II.
Reliability Optimization - The results of above pre­ 
diction indicated that the reliability of the conversion 
assembly needed to be improved from 0.797 to 0.943. There 
was also a strong indication that changes were needed 
in system design philosophy.
First of all, it was readily apparent that preliminary 
designers were somewhat overly concerned with being able 
to perform and contrpl the battery charge and discharge 
functions. This resulted a large number of separate 
alternate modes of operation which, from the weight 
viewpoint caused the assembly to be too reliable. This 
meant that the control assembly could be simplified at a 
saving in weight and volume which would be invested into 
increasing the reliability of conversion assembly.
Another preliminary design concept requiring review 
was the effort to -stay away from power supply switching 
problems and very costly weight and volume penalties 
which would be associated with the employment of redunancy 
in the conversion assembly, The use of ultrareliable 
Minutenian Project parts to negate the need for redundancy 
was one of the main results of this concept. The 
reliability prediction,, however, revealed that the 
use of minuteman parts resulted in the conversion assembly 
reliability being almost entirely a function of the 
reliability of electrical connections. Further, it was 
apparent that the failure rate of soldered or welded 
connections would have to be decreased by two orders 
of magnitude before the initial conversion assembly 
configuration could meet the reliability requirements.
In order to determine what new concepts should be 
adopted for the purpose of generating a design configur­ 
ation with acceptable reliability, the system math model 
was subjected to an optimization effort throughout the 
design period. The initial procedures and results of 
this effort are covered in reference 2.
The mathematical development and supporting theory 
for the optimization procedures used on uower control 
and conversion assemblies are contained in references 10, 
12 and 13. In brief, these procedures permit simultaneous 
consideration of n methods of subassembly reliability 
improvement, such as different types of redundancy, and m 
system parameters, such as weight and volume, in order 
to select the optimum system configuration.
The governing analytical process consists of the 
identification of the area of least reliability in the 
system and the selection of the technique for increasing 
the reliability of that area which is best with respect 
to system parameters such as weight and cost. This 
process is repeated with each new "least reliability 
area" until an optimum system is achieved. The optimum
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system is that final system configuration in 
which the reliability of the least reliable 
area has been maximized to a degree which 
assures satisfaction of the system reliabil­ 
ity requirement without exceeding system 
limits on parameters such as cost, weight 
and volume.
Technical Management Decision Making - The 
results of the reliability prediction and op­ 
timization analyses were used throughout the 
development effort on the power conversion and 
control assemblies. Some specific instances 
in which engineering and/or management deci­ 
sions were based on these analyses are:
1.
2.
The establishment of part procurement 
requirements based on accurate 
application information.
The initiation of a circuit and 
packaging redesign effort for the 
purpose of minimizing electrical 
connections.
The initiation of extensive engineer­ 
ing and manufacturing investigation 
which proved welded connections were 
not needed thus saving the division 
considerable funds.
4.
5.
6.
The selection and functional definition 
of ground command and automatic with 
ground command override switching 9) 
arrangements.
The selection of items to undergo 
stress-strength test to failure 
investigation.
The selection of simplified battery 
charger designs.
AOSO Summary
As a result of the conversion and 
control assembly reconfiguration and design 
improvement program, of which the reliability 
optimization activities were a portion, the 
configuration was improved as shown in 
Table III.
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